# Token Curated Tests Grids Token curated test grids are decentrally-curated grids with intrinsic economic incentives for token holders to curate contents judiciously. Again from Kilt: Token holders have a tactical incentive to challenge and reject every candidate to their registry In the interest of increasing their holdings, this is at odds with their strategic interest of increasing the value of their holdings. An empty list is of no interest to consumers, so candidates would not bother applying to it. Candidates drive fundamental demand for a registry’s intrinsic token, so by behaving tactically rather than strategically, token holders go against their interest and incur a potentially severe financial loss. Generally, it is in the interest of economically rational token holders to behave strategically and curate a high-quality list. The augmented democracy protocol suggests using the same tripartite proving structure as Kilt: Verifier, claimer, and attester, but the latter one is responsible for curating the list of contributors to the test grid: gatherers and curators. Gatherers gather facts about the question, and curators conveniently arrange the information into the most straightforward and easy test possible. The goal of the test is less to test knowledge but to assert the recognition of facts instead. Assuming that this is a good way for tests to be based on verified facts, could there be a case, in specific scenarios, where there would be voter accountability against proven facts? Could this also render elected officials accountable for their decisions when participating in high-level votes? **Deliberative Democracy** On the flip side, shining the light on someone’s disagreement within the consensus could help the individual and the collective. In North American tribes, ”Unanimity requires that everyone involved agrees.” This more thorough approach could be applicable in some instances and could be aided by several rounds of augmented voting. **Staking and Quadratic Voting** \ \ The concept of ”putting your money where your mouth is” has been used successfully by proof of stake. Initially a good idea, whales have successfully tampered with these networks. Whales have a proof-of-stake advantage; the more coin you offer, the higher the chance you have to be selected as a validator. With the existing democracy pallet, proposals are already created with a staked amount. If this could be extended to voting using this same formula: \ cost to the voter = (number of votes)² To even out the voting power. The cost of each vote to a single project from a single contributor will increase, encouraging community contributors to donate to more projects. \ Read more >> **Node Reputation / Performance History** \ \ Leveraging substrate reputation mechanism for feeding Token curated test-grids. WIP \ \&#xNAN;*All of the above is not a solution in itself but can contribute to strengthening the vote and highlighting the weaknesses of a vote in dispute resolution, elections, reaching consensus, or seeking out the truth.*
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